05BUCHAREST1472 / 2005-06-30 13:24:00
Embassy Bucharest
                C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 001472 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2030 
TAGS: ETTC, KNNP, PREL, RO, GG, UP, BU, MD, SECI, law enforcement 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Department TDY PolOff officially observed 
the Romanian-organized Black Sea Border Security Initiative 
(BSBSI) tabletop exercise, held at the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in Bucharest from June 
22-24.  During the exercise, representatives from Romania, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova exchanged information 
regarding how their respective nonproliferation 
infrastructures would respond to a mock WMD incident as 
described in a fictitious scenario, entitled "STYX 2005". 
The Romanians propose to follow-up "STYX 2005" with a 
real-time exercise in October.  All delegations except 
Ukraine broadly participated - GOR officials advised PolOff 
in on-the-margins discussions that they viewed the Ukrainian 
role in BSBSI as problematic.  Romania will concentrate its 
senior level outreach on Bulgaria, given that the strength of 
Sofia's commitment to BSBSI is uncertain.  End Summary. 
2. (U) The (fictitious) "STYX 2005" scenario involved the 
transit of two suspicious vehicles - a truck carrying Cesium 
which was conspicuously avoiding border crossings with 
radiation detection capabilities, and a boat rumored to carry 
nuclear material.  Significantly, Interior Ministry official 
Dorin Grasu served as overall coordinator, indicating greater 
Interior Ministry ownership of BSBSI activities. 
Participants in the exercise were divided between a control 
group, responsible for governing scenario developments, and a 
working group, responsible for formulating governmental 
responses to scenario developments.  Over the course of the 
exercise, the control group posed a total of eight events for 
the working groups to develop answers to.  While all but one 
of the prepared responses were from national governments, 
there was a great deal of coordination between different 
governments represented in the working groups.  On one 
occasion the Georgians and Bulgarians delivered a joint 
3. (C) The one exception was the Ukrainian representative, 
Ivan Zaitsev, Interior Attache of the Ukrainian Embassy to 
Romania.  In a private meeting with the Romanians prior to 
the beginning of the conference, Zaitsev made clear that he 
had no mandate from his government to answer questions put to 
him by the working group.  The Romanians nevertheless granted 
him permission to ask questions of other delegations. 
4. (U) Following the conclusion of the tabletop exercise, 
Romanian MFA nonproliferation chief Dan Neculaescu stated 
that the Romanians were proposing a follow-up exercise in 
October.  In the follow-on exercise, they would run "STYX 
2005" as a real-time operation.  They proposed that a control 
group in Bucharest would govern scenario events and 
communicate them via e-mail to capitals, and that capitals 
would coordinate interagency responses to return to 
Bucharest.  After this received preliminary agreement from 
the other BSBSI states, the Romanians pledged to forward 
further information regarding this concept to the other 
states in August.  They further proposed that, following the 
October exercise, they convene a higher-level policy meeting 
to a.) incorporate lessons learned from "STYX 2005" into 
their respective governmental standard operating procedures, 
b.) evaluate the overall usefulness of "STYX 2005", and c.) 
propose future BSBSI activities.  Romanian Interior Ministry 
official Dorin Grasu added that the purpose of the real-time 
operation and "STYX 2005" generally is to promote a new wave 
of regional nonproliferation cooperation, and expressed his 
hope that BSBSI could be a channel to develop cooperation 
between regional crisis centers. 
5. (U) Ukrainian Embassy Interior Attache Zaitsev thanked the 
Romanians for allowing Ukraine to observe the tabletop 
exercise, and noted that, in order to ensure comprehensive 
Black Sea representation, Russia and Turkey should be invited 
to participate in the October exercise.  Zaitsev also stated 
that he will write to the Ukrainian MFA, urging Ukraine to 
fully participate in October.  Bulgarian MFA official Iasen 
Tomov agreed that it was useful, and stated that other 
regional states could be invited as well - particularly other 
Balkan states.  Georgian Interior Ministry official Archil 
Pavlenishvili stated that joint training under BSBSI would 
also be a positive development.  Moldovan Interior Ministry 
official Victor Nichifor agreed that it was useful, but noted 
that, for future conferences, more time should be allotted to 
allow the participants to prepare. 
6. (C) TDY PolOff met separately with MFA Director General 
for Global Issues Stelian Stoian and MFA nonproliferation 
chief Dan Neculaescu.  (COMMENT: While it has substantially 
evolved over its course, BSBSI was originally Stoian's 
concept.  END COMMENT.)  Stoian emphasized to PolOff that he 
understands the U.S. desire to maintain a low profile, but 
the importance of the U.S.-Romanian partnership needs to be 
underscored as well.  He also pointed out that, despite USG 
urging to depoliticize BSBSI to the extent possible, it is 
occurring within a regional context.  TDY PolOff responded 
that he also agreed that the U.S.-Romanian partnership has 
been critical to BSBSI's successes, but the U.S. viewed it as 
very important that the regional character of the initiative 
be preserved (i.e. it not be seen as directed by the U.S.) 
The U.S. provides technical support and assistance, but this 
needs to be organized by the region itself.  In responding to 
Stoian's second point, TDY PolOff stated that he was familiar 
with other security issues in the Black Sea region (e.g. 
BlackSeaFor, Operation Black Sea Harmony, etc.) but the 
crucial difference between those initiatives and BSBSI is 
that regional MODs were largely peripheral to BSBSI.  There 
is, for all intents and purposes, no military component. 
Unlike those initiatives, BSBSI is predominantly directed 
towards the region's Interior Ministries. 
7. (C) TDY PolOff also noted that, given the apparent 
Ukrainian skepticism balanced with Moldovan and Georgian 
enthusiasm, Bulgarian support is crucial to the success of 
the initiative.  While TDY PolOff noted that Romanian efforts 
to organize the "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise were quite 
good, the prospect of BSBSI success would be greatly enhanced 
should the Bulgarians organize a BSBSI activity as well.  The 
decision by the Bulgarian Interior Ministry to cancel their 
participation in the exercise at the last minute raised 
questions regarding Bulgarian commitment.  (NOTE: The 
Bulgarian representative, MFA security official Iasen Tomov, 
cited a deluge of last-minute taskings as the reason behind 
the Bulgarian cancellations.  He also participated 
constructively, and to all appearances wholeheartedly, in 
conference proceedings.  END NOTE.)  Stoian agreed in 
principle to request Sofia to host a BSBSI activity, and 
possibly the evaluation meeting itself.  Neculaescu also 
agreed to concentrate Romania's diplomatic outreach efforts 
to Bulgaria.  TDY PolOff also met with Tomov privately, and 
asked Bulgaria TO consider organizing a BSBSI activity for 
2006, as Bulgaria and Romania are the participant states with 
the most advanced nonproliferation infrastructure (i.e. 
legal, regulatory, and operational capability).  TDY PolOff 
said the U.S. is willing to look at assisting if the 
Bulgarians provide us with concrete proposals. 
8. (C) Neculaescu raised serious doubts regarding the 
Ukrainians.  In a private meeting with TDY PolOff, Neculaescu 
expressed the GOR's assessment that, contrary to President 
Yushchenko's apparent political commitment to 'Westernize', 
the old-guard in the Ukrainian Civil Service is at best 
indifferent to and at worst actively sabotaging BSBSI. 
Neculaescu characterized Ukrainian Interior Ministry Attache 
as a "liar", and opined that when Zaitsev declared Ukraine 
would "100 percent" participate in the tabletop exercise in 
the May Preparatory Meeting, he was, in fact, lying. 
Neculaescu also expressed skepticism regarding Zaitsev's 
pledge to urge the Ukrainian MFA to fully participate in the 
October real-time exercise.  TDY PolOff commented that it was 
curious that Zaitsev was alone in consistently asking the 
other delegations what the MOD role would be in conducting 
nonproliferation exercise activities, considering Zaitsev is 
allegedly the Interior Attache.  Neculaescu replied that he 
thought it likely that Zaitsev was not who he claimed to be 
(i.e. Neculaescu implied Zaitsev is an intelligence officer.) 
9. (C) Despite scanty Ukrainian participation in the tabletop 
exercise, Neculaescu opined that Zaitsev's call for full 
Turkish and Russian participation in the October real-time 
operation was in bad faith, and should be viewed as a 
solicitation of the Turkish and Russian interest rather than 
an interest in extending positive BSBSI cooperation.  PolOff 
responded that, while he welcomed Turkey and Russia as 
observers, it would be best to delay full Turkish and Russian 
participation until at least the conclusion and evaluation of 
"STYX 2005".  Neither Turkey nor Russia had been to the prior 
meetings, and organizing the logistics for five countries is 
sufficiently challenging for now.  TDY PolOff said that, in 
principle, he saw no problem with Turkey and Russia becoming 
full participants should there be a follow-on BSBSI activity 
in 2006.  TDY PolOff further commented that it might be 
useful having them as silent observers for the October 
exercise, in order to provide transparency (i.e. allay any 
doubts Turkey and Russia may have that BSBSI has a malign 
agenda) and to gauge their willingness to be constructive 
vice obstructive BSBSI participants. 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
10. (C) All-in-all, the BSBSI "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise 
was a success.  With the exception of Ukraine, the 
participant states seemed sincere in their desire to 
cooperate with each other in the field of nonproliferation, 
and seemed enthused by the conference.  While the delegations 
could have coordinated their answers during the exercise 
itself more, the answers they gave were comprehensive and 
well-intentioned.  This bodes well for the October real-time 
operation.  It must be noted that the tabletop exercise was 
the dress rehearsal for October's main event - if four out of 
five BSBSI states (Ukraine excepted) are genuinely interested 
in incorporating the contacts and procedures derived from 
October into their national systems, BSBSI can be judged a 
success.  Given Georgia's and Moldova's unremitting 
enthusiasm, the Romanians have to ensure that Bulgaria is a 
constructive participant in October.  As BSBSI progresses, 
the question of whether and how to positively incorporate 
Turkey, Russia, and other Balkan states into BSBSI activities 
will move increasingly to the forefront. 
11. (U) Participant list follows: 
Mr. Iasen Tomov, MFA 
Mr. Archil Pavlenishvili, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Lasha Vashakmadze, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Nicolos Iashvili, Georgian Embassy to Romania 
Mr. Alexandru Caraman, Intelligence and Security Service 
Mr. Igor Gorodetki, Special Intelligence Service 
Mr. Victor Nichifor, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Dorin Grosu, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Dan Neculaescu, MFA 
Mr. Florian Baciu, National Commission for Nuclear Activity 
Ms. Dana Marca, MFA 
Mr. Victor Mircescu, MFA 
Mr. Alin Tanase, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Lucian Ivan, Interior Ministry 
Mr. Cristian Gandei 
Ms. Mirela Nenea, Special Intelligence Service 
Mr. Nicolae Neferoiu, Foreign Intelligence Service 
Mr. Aurel Stancu, National Authority for Border Customs 
Ms. Maria Andrei, Nuclear Agency 
Mr. Bogdan Dumitriu, Nuclear Agency 
Mr. Dragos Tocae, ANCEX 
Mr. Roman Ioan Fitera, ANCEX 
Mr. Ivan Zaitsev, Ukrainian Embassy to Georgia 
UNITED STATES (observer) 
Mr. John Conlon, U.S. Dept. of State 
12. (U)  TDY PolOff has copies of answers given by Georgian, 
Romanian, Moldovan, and Bulgarian representatives regarding 
the implementation of their national export control 
infrastructure.  For USG personnel interested in copies of 
the "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise documentation, please 
contact EUR/PRA:John Conlon, Ph. (202) 647-6746, Fax: (202) 
647-6039, E-Mail:conlonj"at"state.gov. 

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